Sup. Ct. allows Class Action Arbitration under FAA

In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, No. 12-125 (2013), the Supreme Court ruled that an arbitrator can require a class action arbitration.

The gist of the case is that Sutter, a pediatrician, had a fee-for-services contract, which required arbitration for all contractual disputes.  When Oxford failed to promptly pay him and other physicians, Sutter filed a class action in New Jersey.  After filing, the court compelled arbitration.  The arbitrator concluded that the contract called for class action arbitration.  Sutter appealed to higher courts, but these appeals were denied.

The Supreme Court explained its decision as follows.  First, the parties agreed to go to arbitration in their contract.  Second, an arbitrator looks at the contract, makes a decision based on the contractual language, and this decision is binding.  Thirdly, and most importantly, the Supreme Court explained that judicial review is limited to whether the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the court agreed with the decision.  Consequently, because the arbitrator considered the contract, the arbitrator’s decision stands.  They only way to vacate an arbitral decision is when an arbitrator strayed from his task of interpreting the contract.  In other words, not when he performed his task poorly.

As a note: In prior decisions (Steelworkers Trilogy/Misco) in the labor context under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), the Supreme Court had ruled that a contractual language had to explicitly allow class actions in the arbitration clause.  Here, the arbitration clause did not do so.

This raises the question of how the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) reconciles with LMRA arbitrations when they are both present.  In this case, only the FAA was involved.

via Workplace Prof Blog: SCOTUS OKs Class Arbitration.

Minn. Sup. Ct. reins in expungement power

Minnesota Lawyer (subscription required) has an interesting article regarding expungement of adult and juvenile cases.

In this decision, the Minn. Sup. Ct. declined to recognize a court’s inherent authority to order expungement of executive branch records of an adult’s criminal history (State v. M.D.T.).  When explaining prior precedent, the court differentiated State v. C.A., where the language was dicta and the case did not involve executive records.

The Minn. Sup. Ct. also narrowly construed a juvenile’s statutory expungement remedy in companion cases (In the Matter of the Welfare of: J.J.P.).  Here, the court held that the authority of the court under Minn. Stat. sec. 260B.198 is limited to the order adjudicating the juvenile delinquent.

Supreme Court and collective action dismissals

The Supreme Court has recently decided a collective action case that affects how the litigation process can be cut promptly by defendants.  In summary of the details below, a plaintiff loses its interest in a collective action when an offer completely satisfies the plaintiff’s claim.  Further, if the plaintiff does not move for certification, even though the lawsuit had already started, the plaintiff’s case ends if the claim is no longer alive.

What this might imply is that plaintiffs in a collective action would need to move promptly when seeking certification.  The question, however, is: would you have enough supporting evidence by then?

In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 11-1059 (2013), the Supreme Court held that a collective action (FLSA) is moot when the named plaintiff has no continuing personal interest in the outcome of the lawsuit and no motion for conditional certification has been filed.

The District Court, finding that no other individuals had joined her suit and the Rule 68 offer that was ignored fully satisfied her claim, dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed.  However, the Supreme Court agreed with the District Court, and thus reversed the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

The Supreme Court explained that Sosna v. Iowa, 419 US 393 (1975) and United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 US 388 (1980), held that a class action that was erroneously denied relates back to the time of the erroneous denial — as long as the named plaintiff’s claim remains live at the time of the denial of the class certification.

The Supreme Court, here, found that the named plaintiff had not moved for conditional certification and her claim became moot.  Consequently, the relate back provision did not apply in her case.

As to the Rule 68 offer, the Supreme Court held that the purposes of a collective action would not be frustrated by the offer.  The plaintiff alleged that the Rule 68 had the effect to “pick off” the named plaintiffs before the collection action’s process had run its course.  The Supreme Court explained that in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 US 326 (1980), when the Rule 68 offer did not provide complete relief, the named plaintiffs could appeal because they retained an ongoing, personal economic stake in the lawsuit.

Here, however, the named plaintiff conceded that the Rule 68 offer offered complete relief, and plaintiff asserted no continuing interest in shifting attorney’s fees and costs.

Non-Citizens and Deportation for Convicted Crimes

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 11-702 (2013) is an interesting Supreme Court decision.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 USC 1101, provides that a non-citizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony may be deported from the US.  As way of background, ordinarily, a non-citizen when facing deportation, may ask for discretionary forms of relief and cancellation of the removal.  The exception is for aggravated felonies.

This case comes because among the crimes that are classified as aggravated felonies are illicit drug trafficking offenses.  The issue the Supreme Court addressed is whether this category includes state criminal statutes that extends to the social sharing of a small amount of marijuana.

In a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s position. The court explained that if a state crime of marijuana distribution does not closely match the federal crime of distribution, in a direct comparison of what each covers, it is not an “aggravated felony.”

In this case, the non-citizen came to the US legally in 1984.  In a traffic stop, the police found 1.3 grams of marijuana.  The non-citizen pled guilty to the charge of possession with the intent to distribute.  Under Georgia statute, this violation may be punishable up to 5 years.  Given this, the government alleged this was an aggravated felony.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument because it held the generically defined federal crime is “any federal punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” 18 USC 924(c)(2).  ”[N]ot just any offense ‘under the CSA’.”

The Supreme Court further explained,

This is the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felony.’  Once again we hold that the Government’s approach defies ‘the commonsense conception’ of these terms….

Sharing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, let alone possession with intent to do so, ‘does not fit easily into the ‘every day understanding’ of ‘trafficking,” which ordinarily… means some sort of commercial dealing.’…

Nor is it sensible that a state statute that criminalizes conducted that the CSA treats as a misdemeanor should be designated an ‘aggravated felony.’  We hold that it may not be.

Jane Kelly confirmed for 8th Circuit bench

The Senate confirmed the nomination of Jane Kelly to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals by a vote of 96-0.  There were 4 non-voting votes.  If you can’t find the link, go here and find Vote 00108 (April 24th).

Jane Kelly will be the second woman and first public defender to serve in the history of the court since its establishment in 1891.

Jane Kelly received her bachelor’s degree from Duke University and her law degree from Harvard Law School in 1991.  After her graduation, Jane Kelly clerked for U.S. District Judge Donald J. Porter of South Dakota and Eighth Circuit Court Judge D. Hansen.

Jane Kelly has been an assistant public defender in the Northern District in Iowa since 1992, and the supervising attorney since 1999.

On the Senate floor, Senator Chuck Grassley stated, “She is a credit to all of use who have chosen public service.”

Supreme Court refuses to hear 2nd Amendment case

The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear a case that contended the Second Amendment protects the right to carry a gun in public.  The denial of this petition had no comments.  Because there were no comments to the denied petition, there is no way to know why the Supreme Court chose not to get involved in this controversy.

The case is Kachalsky v. Cacace.  The issues presented to the Supreme Court were:

1. Whether the Second Amendment secures a right to carry handguns for self-defense outside the home; and
2. Whether state officials violate the Second Amendment by denying handgun carry licenses to responsible, law-abiding adults for lack of “proper cause” to bear arms for self-defense.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d. Cir. 2012)) affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the State.  The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.  The district court concluded that carrying concealed weapons in public is “outside of the core of the Second Amendment concern.”  Alternatively, the district court also concluded that the “proper cause” requirement would survive the scrutiny under the Second Amendment.

The SCOTUS blog,

 

 

Attorney Fees and Prevailing Party

This is an interesting case, coming out of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, that reinforces the idea that attorney fees should only be granted to the prevailing party.

In S. Wine and Spirits of Nevada v. Mountain Valley Spring Co., No. 12-1857 (8th Cir. 2013), the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that neither of the parties prevailed in the lawsuit.  Thereby, no attorney fees would be granted.

So why did this case come to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals?  Southern Wine and Spirits won a judgement for $861,000.  In the same token, Mountain Valley won a judgment of $183,000.  Southern argued that it was entitled to attorney fees because it had prevailed on 3 out of its 4 claims and because its monetary award was more than four times larger than the one obtained by Mountain Valley.

The District Court and the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.  Following Nevada law, a party is not the “prevailing party” when both parties are found to be at fault.  See also Glenbrook Homeowners Ass’n v. Glenbrook Co., 901 P.2d 132, 141 (Nev. 1995) (per curiam).

Thereby, in this case, when both parties won a judgment, it is fair to say that both parties have been found at fault.

FTC can serve foreign defendants via Facebook

FTC v. PCCARE Inc., 12 civ-7189 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2013) is a very strange case because it shows how service of process might be altered and in what circumstances.  In this case, the FTC wanted to be able to serve documents other than the Summons and Complaint via Facebook or e-mail.  The Southern District of New York granted this request.

This is a very strange case.  Generally, the Hague Service Convention has guidelines detailing how abroad defendants may be served.  The Hague Service Convention doesn’t expressly authorize service on foreign defendants by email or social media accounts.

So why could you serve documents a foreign defendant over Facebook?

The court explained that “A court in this district has held that the Hague Service Convention only applies to the initial service of process, not subsequent documents.”  See SEC v. Credit Bankcorp., Ltd., 2001 WL 666158, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 14, 2011).  In addition the court relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), whereby it stated,

a Court may fashion means of service on an individual in a foreign county, so long as the ordered means of service (1) is not prohibited by international agreement; and (2) comports with constitutional notions of due process.”  SEC c. Anticevix, 2009 WL 361739, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Fec. 13, 2009).

The court reasoned that federal courts need to keep an open mind about technology.

The court acknowledges that service by Facebook is a relatively novel concept, and that it is conceivable that defendants will not in fact receive notice by this means.  But, as noted, the proposed service by Facebook is intended not as the sole method of service, but instead to backstop the service upon each defendant at his, or its, known email address. And history teaches that, as technology advances and modes of communication progress, courts must be open to considering requests to authorize service via technological means of then-recent vintage, rather than dismissing them out of hand as novel.

via FTC can serve foreign defendants via Facebook, federal judge rules – ABA Journal.

Minnesota Lodestar Fees in Consumer Protection cases

On February 13th, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the lodestar method must be used when determining attorney fees in consumer protection cases.

An unanimous Minnesota Supreme Court in Green v. BMW of N. Am., A11-0581 (Minn. Feb. 13, 2013), ruled that the lodestar method applies for the attorney fee calculation under Minnesota’s lemon law.  In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that courts must consider, among other factors, the amount involved in the litigation and the results obtained.

In the Green case, the district court issued a verdict in favor of Green and awarded her $25,157 in damages.  The district court also granted attorney fees and costs in the amount of $229,064.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision, and remanded.

When determining the appropriate amount for fees – the court did not consider any other factors, other than the reasonableness of the fees.  The court heavily relied on the policy behind the fee-shifting provisions.  The court explained that the purpose of fee-shifting provisions was to provide incentives for attorneys to take these types of cases.

The district court did not award fees under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act because the court did not allow for double recovery.

The Supreme Court reversed the fees decision because the lodestar method should have been applied.  Under Minnesota’s Lemon Law, Minn. Stat. 325F.665, subd. 9, consumers “may bring a civil action to enforce” the lemon law and “recover costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the civil action.”

The Supreme Court explained that Minnesota courts have consistently used the lodestar method for determining the reasonableness of fees.  In fact, courts have used the lodestar method in numerous settings, including MFLSA, MHRA, Minnesota Securities Act, and in polygraph testing.  Given the broad application of lodestar, the Supreme Court held that applying lodestar in consumer protection cases was appropriate.

When applying the lodestar method, courts must first determine the number of hours reasonably expended and multiply those hours by a reasonable hourly rate.  When determining “the reasonable value of legal services,” the court must consider “all relevant circumstances.”  The Supreme Court explained,

The circumstances that inform a court’s “determine[ation of] reasonableness include ‘the time and labor required; the nature and difficulty of the responsibility assumed; the amount involved and the results obtained; the fees customarily charged for similar legal services; the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; and the fee arrangement existing between counsel and the client.’”

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the “amount involved” was confined to a consideration of the amount involved only as it relates to a prevailing party’s percentage of success.  The Supreme Court held that courts look “to both the amount involved and the results obtained.” (emphasis in original).

NLRB Overrules Anheuser-Busch, Favors Balancing Test on Witness Statements

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on Piedmont Gardens, 359 NLRB No. 46, overruled a 36-year-old “bright-line rule” that denied labor organization representatives access to witness statements obtained by unionized employers, finding NLRB should balance the interests of unions and employers in assessing union requests for the names or statements of witnesses interviewed during a company investigation.

By overruling Anheuser-Busch, 237 NLRB 982 (1978), and applying instead the Detroit Edison balancing test, the NLRB found that respondents violated the NLRA by failing to provide the witness statements.  In the Detroit Edison balancing test, the board will balance the union’s need for relevant information against the legitimate and substantial employer’s interest in keeping information confidential.

via Adjunct Law Prof Blog: NLRB Overrules Anheuser-Busch Precedent, Favors Balancing Test on Witness Statements.