Category Archives: rules

NLRB Now Allows E-Signatures Gathered From Social Media To Be Used For Election Petitions

Generally, signatures for election petitions have to be in writing.  However, this changed this week.  This greatly speeds up election petitions, as well as eases up on the difficult battle that can be an election.

The General Counsel imposed additional requirements for electronic signatures.  Electronic signatures must contain the signer’s name, email address or social media account, phone number, authorization language agreed to, date, and name of the employer.  The signature cannot contain private identifying information like the signer’s date of birth or Social Security number.  The union submitting the electronic signatures must provide a declaration attesting to the methods used to validate the signature.

The General Counsel’s guidance is effective immediately.  The guidance could be viewed as another example of the Board bypassing regulatory processes to institute union-friendly procedures.  The practical impact of the guidance is that unions may immediately use email and social media to gather signatures with limited review of their authenticity.

Given the Board’s recently instituted election rules and cases concerning access to employer email systems, this guidance could significantly accelerate the organizing process.

[Emphasis added.]

Source: The NLRB To Now Allow E-Signatures Gathered From Social Media To Be Used For Election Petitions? – LaborUnionReport.com

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E-Mails and NRLB: Do Employees Have Rights?

On April 30, 2014, the NLRB announced that it is considering overturning Register Guard, 351 NLRB 110 (2007), enfd. in relevant part and remanded sub nom, Guard Publishing v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

The issue resolves around the current existing law that states:

Employees have no statutory right to use the[ir] Employer’s e-mail system for Section 7 purposes.

The NLRB is requesting amici briefs that address the following questions:

  1. Should the Board reconsider the conclusion in Register Guard that employees do not have a statutory right to use their employer’s email system (or other electronic communication systems) for Section 7 purposes?
  2. If the Board overrules Register Guard, what standard(s) of employee access to the employer’s electronic communication systems should be established? What restrictions, if any, may an employer place on such access, and what factors are relevant to such restrictions?
  3. In deciding the above questions, to what extent and how should the impact on the employer of employees’ use of an employer’s electronic communications technology affect the issue?
  4. Do employee personal electronic devices (e.g., phones, tablets), social media accounts, and/or personal email accounts affect the proper balance to the be struck between employers’ rights and employees’ Section 7 rights to communicate about work-related matters? If so, how?
  5. Identify any other technological issues concerning email or other electronic communication systems that the Board should reconsider in answering the foregoing questions, including any relevant changes that may have occurred in electronic communications technology since Register Guard was decided. How should these affect the Board’s decision?

 

The briefs are due on or before June 16, 2014 and cannot exceed 25 pages.

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Filibuster Changes

I heard about this vote a while back and it will be interesting to see how it plays out.  You hear about this all the time.  The majority party (regardless of whether they are Democrat or Republican) wants to change filibuster rules.

This year the number of bills passed has been the lowest since Congress was formed.  NBC calls it “Do-Nothing” Congress. USA Today describes the 2011-12 period as the “least productive year on record” and 2013 as being on track as the “least productive single year in modern history.”

The question is then, do we need filibuster reform?  The answer is yes.  To what extent?  This is heavily contested.

The Senate approved the most fundamental alteration of its rules by ending the minority’s party ability to filibuster most presidential nominees in response to the partisan gridlock that has plagued Congress.  (NY Times article).

Under the change, the Senate will be able to cut off debate on executive and judicial branch nominees with a simple majority rather than rounding up a supermajority of 60 votes.  This does not apply to all nominees, such as Supreme Court nominees.

via In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster – NYTimes.com.

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Rule 68 does not moot case

In Emily Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Protection Corp., No. 11-57239 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2013), the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an offer of judgment (Rule 68) did not make a plaintiff’s case moot.  This is an important case because it provides guidance when considering when to file summary judgment when a Rule 68 offer has been made.

Rule 68 is when a party offers opposing party a judgment for full satisfaction that the opposing party could recover at trial.  In this case, First American offered $7,019.32 plus costs.  Diaz, the plaintiff, declined this offer.  Thereby the issue was whether offering the money made the lawsuit moot.

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the First American’s offer, even if it fully satisfied the plaintiff’s claim, did not make the case moot.  When reaching this conclusion the 9th Circuit cited Kagan’s dissent in Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1528-29 (2013).

‘[A] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’ By those measures, an unaccepted offer of judgment cannot moot a case.   When a plaintiff rejects such an offer – however good the terms – her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief. An unaccepted settlement offer – like any unaccepted contract offer – is a legal nullity, with no operative effect.”

Id. at 1536 (citation omitted).

via Courthouse News Service.

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Government Shut Down and the NLRB

When the shut down occurred, the NLRB closed its doors.  What is interesting is that the NLRB’s website is also down.

There are several notes that need to be pointed down.  Even though the NLRB is shut down, unfair labor practice charges’ statute of limitations of 6 months keeps running.  The statute of limitations is the time that a person/organization/company has to enforce their rights.  After that period, they may lose their right to do so.

The federal register provides:

Extensions for time of filing cannot apply to the 6-month period provided by Section 10(b) of the Act for filing charges, 29 U.S.C. 169(b), or to Applications for awards of fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504.

….

(emphasis added).

The federal register also cautions persons to file the charge via fax and to serve the charges themselves.  The federal register states:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, persons wishing to file a charge pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, and for whom the 6-month period of Section 10(b) may expire during the interruption in the Board’s normal operations, are cautioned that the operation of Section 10(b) during an interruption in the Board’s normal operation is uncertain.

Consequently, it would be prudent to file the charge during the interruption in the Board’s operations by faxing a copy of the charge to the appropriate Regional Office.

…..

Moreover, persons filing a charge are reminded that it is their responsibility… to serve a copy of the charge upon the person against whom the charge is made.  While Regional Directors ordinarily serve a copy of the charge on a person against whom the charge is made as a matter of courtesy, they do not assume responsibility for such service, and it is unlikely that the Agency will be able to serve the charges during any period of shutdown due to a lapse in appropriated funds.

(emphasis added).

In summary, you must do as follows:

  1. Serve the unfair labor practice charge and the applications of fees and other expenses via fax.
  2. Serve the papers to the person against whom the charge is made.

Regarding other issues, the federal register explains that they are postponed.  These include hearings in front of Administrative Law Judges, pre and post election hearings, and filing or serving of documents (including briefs and appeals).

via NLRB |.

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Home Health Care Rule and FLSA

Starting January 1, 2015 home care aides are not exempt from Wage and Overtime laws.  The Department of Labor released a press release discussing this wage and hour change as well as unveiling a new web portal with interactive tools.  The web portal for Home Care can be accessed here.

In the DOL’s press release, DOL stated,

This change will result in nearly two million direct care workers – such as home health aides, personal care aides and certified nursing assistants – receiving the same basic protections already provided to most U.S. workers.

The DOL also explained that this wage and hour new rule did not apply to companionship workers.  The DOL stated,

The final rule also clarifies that direct care workers who perform medically-related services for which training is typically a prerequisite are not companionship workers and therefore are entitled to the minimum wage and overtime.

And, in accordance with Congress’ initial intent, individual workers who are employed only by the person receiving services or that person’s family or household and engaged primarily in fellowship and protection (providing company, visiting or engaging in hobbies) and care incidental to those activities, will still be considered exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime protections.

The final rule can be accessed here.

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Attorney Client Privilege: Law firms and In-House Counsel

This is a very interesting article.  The attorney-client privilege is an important confidentiality rule that protects certain communications between a client and the lawyer/law-firm.  The attorney-client privilege is an important privilege because it encourages clients to be candid with their attorney.

The ABA adopted Resolution 103, which provides that the attorney-client privilege extends to communications between a law firm and in-house counsel for the purpose of facilitating legal services.  The resolution provides that these communications are protected to the same extent between the lawyer/law-firm and personnel of a corporation or other entity.

The ABA explains,

The measure stems from the increasing complexity of regulation, rules of professional conduct and greater disclosure obligations under legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

via Attorney-client privilege should apply to law firms consults with in-house counsel, ABA House says – ABA Journal.

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The Voting Rights Act

The Supreme Court ruled on Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 NAMUDNO v. Holder, No. 08-322 (2013), answering the question of the whether a district (not the state) could seek the bailout provision under the Voting Rights Act.

The decision of the Supreme Court is important here because it did not rule on the issue of whether the Voting Rights Act was constitutional.

Instead, the Supreme Court ruled that the district could use the “bailout” provision under the Voting Rights Act, even if the state could not.  In holding this, the Supreme Court explained that the district fell under the definition of a “State of political subdivision,” and thereby could use the “bailout” provision.

Generally, the Voting Rights Act requires certain states to get pre-clearance before making any changes to elections.  One of these states includes Texas.  However, there is a provision (“bailout”) that states that the state can seek a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel District Court in Washington, D.C.  42 USC 1973(b)(a)(1), 1973c(a).  The bailout provision requires:

  • The state has not used any forbidden voting test for the last 10 years;
  • The state has not been subject to a valid objection under the Voting Rights Act section 5;
  • The state has not been found liable for other rights act violations; and
  • The state has engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of voters.

The Voting Rights Act only authorizes a bailout suit by a State or political subdivision.  42 USC 19873b(a)(1)(A).

Here, the government argued that under the statutory definition of the bailout provision, a district could not seek a bailout provision.  The Act provided that a “‘political subdivision’ shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.” Section 14(c)(2).  The government argued that because the district was not a county or parish and did not conduct its own voter registration, the district was not covered under the Act.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed.  Citing previous Supreme Court cases, the Supreme Court stated the definition of a “political subdivision” must be broad and not limited to the statutory definition.  The Supreme Court explained,

Our decisions have already established that the statutory definition in [section] 14(c)(2) does not apply to every use of the term “political subdivision” in the Act.  We have, for example, concluded that the definition does not apply to the pre clearance obligation of [section] 5.

There, we expressly rejected the suggestion that the city of Sheffield was beyond the ambit of [section] 5 because it did not itself register voters and hence was not a political subdivision as the term is defined in [section] 14(c)(2) of the Act… [O]nce a State has been designed for coverage, [section] 14(c)(2)’s definition of political subdivision has no operative significance in determining the reach of [section] 5.

(markings in original).  Taking a broad approach, the Supreme Court ruled that a district was a political subdivision.

In addition, the Supreme Court noted that the 1982 amendments provided that even if the state could not bailout, a political subdivision might be able to assuming it met the bailout requirements.

via We gave you a chance: Today’s Shelby County decision in Plain English : SCOTUSblog.

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No citizenship proof for voters

The Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, where the Supreme Court ruled that federal law preempted Arizona’s law.  In other words, it held that Arizona’s requirement of proof of citizenship was in conflict with the National Voter Registration Act.  Thereby, that requirement was rejected.

Arizona’s law required registered voters to show proof of citizenship.  Under Arizona’s law, a person must be a citizen to be eligible to vote.  This case concerned only how Arizona was trying to enforce that qualification.  In 2004, Arizona voters passed Proposition 200, which provided that voters must “present proof of citizenship when they register to vote and to present identification when they vote on election day.”  If an individual does not provide “satisfactory” proof of citizenship, then the application must be rejected.

The issue here is how this citizenship-proof law and the National Voting Registration Act work together.  The Voter Registration Act required that states must “accept and use” the Federal Form.  The Voter Registration Act provided that a state shall “ensure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election… if the valid voter registration form of the applicant is post-marked.” (italics in original).

Although the Voter Registration Act provides that states can create their own state-specific voter-registration forms, the Voting Registration Act also places a backstop.  The Supreme Court explained that,

No matter what procedural hurdles a State’s own form imposes, the Federal Form guarantees that a simple means of registering to vote in federal elections will be available.

Based on this language, the Supreme Court rejected Arizona’s arguments.  If Arizona, or any other state, could demand Federal Form applicants additional pieces of information, “the Federal Form ceases to perform any meaningful function, and would be a feeble means of ‘increas[ing] the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal Office.” (quotations and marks in original).

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EEOC’s First GINA Suit Settlement

The first settlement between the EEOC and an employer over GINA is important because it brings attention to this relatively new law.  EEOC charges alleging GINA violations have increased each year.  Consequently, it is important for employers to ensure their policies and procedures are compliant with GINA procedures.

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) went into effect in 2009.  Some of GINA’s regulations are as follows.

  • It is illegal for employers to discriminate against employees or applicants based on their genetic information.
  • Employers cannot request or obtain genetic information, which includes any information about an employee or an applicant’s family history.
  • GINA also applies to third parties.  So, employers cannot request or obtain family medical history, even through a third-party medical provider or examiner.
  • There are exceptions for voluntary health risk assessments.  However, if the employee is receiving an incentive for completion of the Health Risk Assessment, the employer must make clear that an employee need not answer any of the questions about family medical history in order to obtain the incentive.

On May 7, 2013, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) reached a milestone of sorts as it filed – and then settled – its first complaint ever alleging genetic discrimination under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”).

The EEOC filed suit in Oklahoma federal court against Fabricut Inc., one of the world’s largest distributors of decorative fabrics, alleging that Fabricut violated GINA and the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by unlawfully asking a job applicant for her family medical history in a pre-employment, post-job offer medical examination, and allegedly rescinding her job offer based on the belief that she had carpal tunnel syndrome.

The EEOC and Fabricut reached a settlement, which is the first settlement in a GINA case.  In the consent decree, Fabricut agreed to pay $50,000 but did not admit to violating GINA or the ADA.

via EEOC’s First GINA Suit Serves As Reminder of Pre-Employment Exam Pitfall | Proskauer Rose LLP – JDSupra.

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