Category Archives: wage

WI State Patrol rescinding raises because they owe the police overtime wages

The Star Tribune had a sad, yet unsurprising, article about WI taking the raises away from its officers after it was determined that they owed back wages to those officers…

MADISON, Wis. — The Wisconsin State Patrol is rescinding pay raises for officers who provide security to Gov. Scott Walker after federal regulators said they are due overtime pay dating back to May 2013.Department of Transportation spokeswoman Peg Schmitt said Tuesday that in light of the determination by the U.S. Department of Labor that the officers are due overtime, the $4-an-hour raises given the officers in February will be withdrawn.The 10 officers in the Dignitary Protection Unit provide protection to Walker around the clock, including when he is outside of Wisconsin running for president. They also protect Lt. Gov. Rebecca Kleefisch and visiting dignitaries.The raises that took effect in February had increased salaries for most members of the unit from around $32 an hour to about $36 an hour.

Source: Wisconsin State Patrol rescinding raises for Walker security – StarTribune.com

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Home Health Care Rule and FLSA

Starting January 1, 2015 home care aides are not exempt from Wage and Overtime laws.  The Department of Labor released a press release discussing this wage and hour change as well as unveiling a new web portal with interactive tools.  The web portal for Home Care can be accessed here.

In the DOL’s press release, DOL stated,

This change will result in nearly two million direct care workers – such as home health aides, personal care aides and certified nursing assistants – receiving the same basic protections already provided to most U.S. workers.

The DOL also explained that this wage and hour new rule did not apply to companionship workers.  The DOL stated,

The final rule also clarifies that direct care workers who perform medically-related services for which training is typically a prerequisite are not companionship workers and therefore are entitled to the minimum wage and overtime.

And, in accordance with Congress’ initial intent, individual workers who are employed only by the person receiving services or that person’s family or household and engaged primarily in fellowship and protection (providing company, visiting or engaging in hobbies) and care incidental to those activities, will still be considered exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime protections.

The final rule can be accessed here.

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Fair Labor Standard Act and Individual Liability

In Torres et al. v. Gristedes Operating Corp. et al., Case No. 11-4035 (July 9, 2013), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a mayoral candidate, a supermarket owner, and an executive can be individually liable for settlement payments arising of a Fair Labor Standard Act class action.

In this case, the parties settled the class action.  A class action is a discrimination case brought by a few plaintiffs on behalf of many employees.  All of the members who agreed to be part of the class (the individuals who were discriminated against) receive their part of the settlement.  In order for a fair disbursement, the Judge must adopt the settlement.

Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to pay $3.5 million to the class.  However, the defendants defaulted on the payments.  The judge’s order allowed the class to enforce the settlement.  Defendants, who sought to change the settlement, stated that they were not bound by the settlement because they were not “employers.”

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.  The Court noted that the defendants exercised “operational control” that affected the class’ employment.  For example, based of their decisions, the employees’ wages were affected.  Because defendants were employers, defendants were bound by the settlement.  Based on this decision, defendants now have to pay the owed money.

via Labor Employment Law Blog: Second Circuit Imposes Individual Liability on New York Mayoral Candidate for Fair Labor Standards Act Settlement.

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Safe Act for Victims of Domestic Violence of Sexual Assault

On October 1, 2013, the “Safe Act” becomes effective.  The Safe Act provides 20 days of unpaid leave to victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.  The employer can require that this unpaid leave be covered under FMLA, New Jersey FMLA, vacation, or personal leave.

The purpose of the Safe Act is to provide New Jersey victims with time to deal with matters related to an incident of domestic abuse or sexual assault.  The Safe Act covers:

  1. The employee,
  2. The employee’s child,
  3. The employee’s parent,
  4. The employee’s spouse,
  5. The employee’s domestic partner, or
  6. The employee’s civil union partner.

Within 12 months of the incident, the Safe Act’s purpose is to provide the victim of domestic abuse or sexual assault can:

  • Seek medical attention for, or recover from, physical or psychological injuries;
  • Obtain servies from victim services organization;
  • Obtain psychological or other counseling;
  • Participate in safety planning, temporarily or permanent relocate, or undertake other actions to increase safety;
  • Seek legal assistance or remedies; or
  • Attend, participate in, or prepare for court proceedings.

If the employer violates the Safe Act, the employee can ask for the following remedies: (1) Reinstatement; (2) compensation for lost wages and benefits; (3) an injunction; (4) attorney’s fees and costs; (5) civil find of $1,000 to $2,000 for a first time violation; and (6) a fine of $5,000 for any subsequent violations.

via Labor Employment Law Blog: New Jersey Provides Unpaid Leave to Victims of Domestic Violence.

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EEOC wins over $1.5 million in sexual harassment case

The EEOC has issued a press release announcing a big victory for sexual harassment cases.  These cases are often dismissed.  For instance, according to EEOC 2011 statistics, the EEOC received 11,364 sexual harassment complaints.  Of these, 53% were found to have no reasonable cause.  This is an increase from 2010, where the percentage was of 50.1%.  Since 1997, the percentage of cases dismissed has been in an upwards trend.

In the EEOC case against New Breed Logistics (Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-02696-STA-tmp), the jury awarded $177,094 in back pay, $486,000 in compensatory damages, and $850,000 in punitive damages.

Following the 7-day trial, the jury found that the warehouse supervisor subjected 3 temporary workers to unwelcome sexual touching and lewd, obscene and vulgar  sexual remarks at the company’s Avaya Memphis area warehouse facility.  Further, the jury found that a supervisor fired the three temp workers because they complained about the harassment.

 

via Jury Awards More Than $1.5 Million in EEOC Sexual Harassment and Retaliation Suit against New Breed Logistics | U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) – JDSupra.

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DOL clarifies expansion of FMLA due to ADAAA

The DOL published Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2013-1, which clarifies the expansion of FMLA.  The DOL explained that the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) expanded more than just employer liability for disability claims, but also expanded the scope of FMLA coverage for children.

The DOL clarified the following.

  • The DOL adopted the ADA’s definition of disability to define “mental or physical disability” for purposes of defining a son or daughter 18 years or older.  See 58 Fed. Reg. 31794, 31799 (June 4, 1993).  The 2008 FMLA Final Rule explicitly adopts the ADAAA’s changes to the ADA’s definition of disability;
  • The definition of a “son or daughter” is defined by the definition of a disability under the ADAAA, which “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage;”
  • The determination of whether an adult son or daughter is incapable of self-care under the FMLA focuses on whether the individual currently needs active assistance or supervision in performing three or more activities of daily living (or ADLs) including “grooming, hygiene, bathing, dressing and eating;” or instrumental activities of daily living (or IADLs) including “cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, using telephones, and using a post-office, etc.;”
  • A serious health condition is an illness, injury impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care or continuing treatment by a healthcare provider; and
  • For a parent to take FMLA leave to care for an adult son or daughter, the parent must be “needed to care” for that son or daughter due to the serious health condition.

In the Administrative opinion, the DOL provides examples.

via Department of Labor Clarifies When an Employee May Take FMLA Leave to Care for Adult Children | Orrick – Global Employment Law Group – JDSupra.

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Successor Liability does not cover federal claims

Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC (7th Cir. 2013) held that  a buyer of a company’s assets can’t rely on state law to keep  a seller’s violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) from transferring to the buyer of the Seller company’s assets.  This standard has been previously applied to the LMRA, NLRA, Title VII, ADEA, and FMLA.

The Seventh Circuit explained that federal labor law claims are governed by federal common law, not state law.  Further, the court explained that employees do not have the power to stop an owner from selling the company.  Therefore, the buyer (successor) is stuck with the seller’s (prior owner) liability regardless of what the contract states.

To determine whether successor liability will apply, the Seventh Circuit considered the following multi-part balancing test:

  1. Whether the successor had notice of the pending law suit;
  2. Whether the predecessor would have been able to provide the relief sought in the lawsuit before the sale;
  3. Whether the predecessor could have provided relief after the sale;
  4. Whether the successor can provide the relief sought in the suit (if not successor liability is a phantom); and
  5. Whether there is continuity between the operations and work force of the predecessor and the successor – which favors successor liability because nothing really has changed.

via Buyer Beware of Successor Liability For FLSA Claims | Sands Anderson PC – JDSupra.

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Supreme Court and collective action dismissals

The Supreme Court has recently decided a collective action case that affects how the litigation process can be cut promptly by defendants.  In summary of the details below, a plaintiff loses its interest in a collective action when an offer completely satisfies the plaintiff’s claim.  Further, if the plaintiff does not move for certification, even though the lawsuit had already started, the plaintiff’s case ends if the claim is no longer alive.

What this might imply is that plaintiffs in a collective action would need to move promptly when seeking certification.  The question, however, is: would you have enough supporting evidence by then?

In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 11-1059 (2013), the Supreme Court held that a collective action (FLSA) is moot when the named plaintiff has no continuing personal interest in the outcome of the lawsuit and no motion for conditional certification has been filed.

The District Court, finding that no other individuals had joined her suit and the Rule 68 offer that was ignored fully satisfied her claim, dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed.  However, the Supreme Court agreed with the District Court, and thus reversed the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

The Supreme Court explained that Sosna v. Iowa, 419 US 393 (1975) and United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 US 388 (1980), held that a class action that was erroneously denied relates back to the time of the erroneous denial — as long as the named plaintiff’s claim remains live at the time of the denial of the class certification.

The Supreme Court, here, found that the named plaintiff had not moved for conditional certification and her claim became moot.  Consequently, the relate back provision did not apply in her case.

As to the Rule 68 offer, the Supreme Court held that the purposes of a collective action would not be frustrated by the offer.  The plaintiff alleged that the Rule 68 had the effect to “pick off” the named plaintiffs before the collection action’s process had run its course.  The Supreme Court explained that in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 US 326 (1980), when the Rule 68 offer did not provide complete relief, the named plaintiffs could appeal because they retained an ongoing, personal economic stake in the lawsuit.

Here, however, the named plaintiff conceded that the Rule 68 offer offered complete relief, and plaintiff asserted no continuing interest in shifting attorney’s fees and costs.

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Minnesota Senate passes increased funding for public defenders

Minnesota Lawyer (subscription required) reports on the bill for public defenders’ funding.  The background of the funding for public defenders is as follows.

In 2008, public defenders were funded through attorney’s registration fees.  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld this type of funding.  Through this funding, the state Board of Public Defense was able to generate around $1.9 million annually.  This request was reapproved in 2011.

However, in December, the state Board of Public Defense withdrew its request to earmark funding from the attorney registration fee.    This decision came in December, when various committees and group sections of the Minnesota State Board Association removed its support for the petition.

On Tuesday, April 16th, 2013, the state Senate passed a judiciary funding bill that increases funding for public defenders.  The bill provides $5 million for increased employee salary and benefits for public defenders.  The bill also provides $5.6 million for new public defenders positions that will reduce caseloads.  The Senate bill was passed by 47-18 votes.

The Senate Judiciary Finance Division Chairman Ron Latz (DFL-St. Louis Park) stated that the bill helps alleviate a public defender system that is “overworked, overburdened, [and] has some of the biggest caseloads in the country.”

via Minnesota Senate passes increased funding for public defenders | Minnesota Lawyer.

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Donning and Doffing: paying for changing “work clothes”?

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to decide the Donning and Doffing issue as, how does Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) define “changing clothes.”

In Sandifer v. U.S. Steel, a class of 800 members filed a collective action against U.S. Steel Corp.  The issue on the 7th Circuit Court was whether workers deserved overtime pay for the time spent changing into work clothes and walking from locker rooms to their work site.

The FLSA ordinarily requires that workers be paid at least the federal minimum wage for all hours worked, and time and a half for hours worked over 40 hours in a week.  However, Section 203(o) provides that any time spent changing “clothes” at the beginning or end of each workday may be excluded from working time by the express terms of, or custom or practice under, a bona fide collective bargaining agreement.  In Sandifer, the collective bargaining agreement did not require compensation for changing time.

In this collective action, the class argued that Section 203(o) exclusion was inapplicable because their work attire did not constitute “clothes,” but rather “safety equipment.”  The alleged work clothes in this case included: flame-retardant pants and jacket, work gloves, metatarsal boots, hard hats, safety glasses, ear plugs, and a “snood” (a hood that covers the top of the head, the chin, and the neck).

The district court held that the FLSA did not require compensation for clothes-changing time.  The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  The 7th Circuit explained that the articles seems to be clothing.  The 7th Circuit stated that the articles of clothing were both, clothing and personal protective equipment,

Protection – against sun, cold, wind, blisters, stains, insect bites, and being spotted by animals that one is hunting – is a common function of clothing, and an especially common function of work clothes worn by factory workers.  It would be absurd to exclude all work clothes that have a protective function… and thus limit the exclusion largely to actors’ costumes and waiters’ and doormen’s uniforms.  Remember that the section covers not only clothes-changing time but also washing-up time, and workers who wear work clothes for self-protection in a dangerous or noxious work environment are far more likely to require significant time for washing up after work than a waiter.”

(emphasis added).

In addition, the 7th Circuit relied heavily on the fact that the collective bargaining agreement did not imply that workers were to be compensated for the time spent changing into work clothes, and washing up and changing back.

via Courthouse News Service.

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