This is a very interesting article. The attorney-client privilege is an important confidentiality rule that protects certain communications between a client and the lawyer/law-firm. The attorney-client privilege is an important privilege because it encourages clients to be candid with their attorney.
The ABA adopted Resolution 103, which provides that the attorney-client privilege extends to communications between a law firm and in-house counsel for the purpose of facilitating legal services. The resolution provides that these communications are protected to the same extent between the lawyer/law-firm and personnel of a corporation or other entity.
The ABA explains,
The measure stems from the increasing complexity of regulation, rules of professional conduct and greater disclosure obligations under legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
via Attorney-client privilege should apply to law firms consults with in-house counsel, ABA House says – ABA Journal.
In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, No. 12-125 (2013), the Supreme Court ruled that an arbitrator can require a class action arbitration.
The gist of the case is that Sutter, a pediatrician, had a fee-for-services contract, which required arbitration for all contractual disputes. When Oxford failed to promptly pay him and other physicians, Sutter filed a class action in New Jersey. After filing, the court compelled arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that the contract called for class action arbitration. Sutter appealed to higher courts, but these appeals were denied.
The Supreme Court explained its decision as follows. First, the parties agreed to go to arbitration in their contract. Second, an arbitrator looks at the contract, makes a decision based on the contractual language, and this decision is binding. Thirdly, and most importantly, the Supreme Court explained that judicial review is limited to whether the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the court agreed with the decision. Consequently, because the arbitrator considered the contract, the arbitrator’s decision stands. They only way to vacate an arbitral decision is when an arbitrator strayed from his task of interpreting the contract. In other words, not when he performed his task poorly.
As a note: In prior decisions (Steelworkers Trilogy/Misco) in the labor context under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), the Supreme Court had ruled that a contractual language had to explicitly allow class actions in the arbitration clause. Here, the arbitration clause did not do so.
This raises the question of how the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) reconciles with LMRA arbitrations when they are both present. In this case, only the FAA was involved.
via Workplace Prof Blog: SCOTUS OKs Class Arbitration.
Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC (7th Cir. 2013) held that a buyer of a company’s assets can’t rely on state law to keep a seller’s violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) from transferring to the buyer of the Seller company’s assets. This standard has been previously applied to the LMRA, NLRA, Title VII, ADEA, and FMLA.
The Seventh Circuit explained that federal labor law claims are governed by federal common law, not state law. Further, the court explained that employees do not have the power to stop an owner from selling the company. Therefore, the buyer (successor) is stuck with the seller’s (prior owner) liability regardless of what the contract states.
To determine whether successor liability will apply, the Seventh Circuit considered the following multi-part balancing test:
- Whether the successor had notice of the pending law suit;
- Whether the predecessor would have been able to provide the relief sought in the lawsuit before the sale;
- Whether the predecessor could have provided relief after the sale;
- Whether the successor can provide the relief sought in the suit (if not successor liability is a phantom); and
- Whether there is continuity between the operations and work force of the predecessor and the successor – which favors successor liability because nothing really has changed.
via Buyer Beware of Successor Liability For FLSA Claims | Sands Anderson PC – JDSupra.
This month, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether it is constitutional for the State to require DNA collection of arrested individuals. The case is Maryland v. King. The argument is set for February 26, 2013.
As way of background:
- The federal government and at least 26 states (including California, Illinois, and Florida) take DNA samples from some or all who are arrested but not yet convicted of serious crimes.
- Last month, President Obama signed into law the Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act. The statute will help pay the start-up costs for other states to begin testing people who are arrested.
So what does this issue mean? The issue is whether the State, without a search warrant, can take a DNA swap of an arrested individual – who has not been convicted.
The Maryland Court of Appeals stated the 4th amendment, which bars unreasonable searches, protects people who haven’t been convicted from having to provide DNA evidence. In addition, the court stated, “Although arrestees do not have all the expectations of privacy enjoyed by the general public, the presumption of innocence bestows on them greater protections than convicted felons, parolees or probationers.”
The Maryland Court of Appeals further explained that DNA samples “contain a massive amount of deeply personal information.”
This is an illustrative case as to why attorneys want to take precautions when producing discovery. The case is Inhalation Plastics, Inc. v. Medex Cardio-Pulmonary, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-116, 2012 WL 3731483 /0S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2012).
In this case, the court held that privilege had been waived as to 347 pages of inadvertently produced emails where, among other things, Defendant failed to establish the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent the disclosure and “failed to take adequate measures to rectify or mitigate the damage of the disclosure.”
Here, Defendant did not stamp any documents as confidential. Upon reviewing the documents at issue, the court held that those documents were covered under the attorney-client privilege. However, the court found that the privilege had been waived. The court highlighted the following facts:
- Defendant’s lack of specificity as to who conducted the review and how the review was conducted. The general assertion that multiple lawyers reviewed it was not enough.
- Defendant failed to produce a privilege log during discovery;
- 4.6% of the documents were inadvertently produced, which the Court found to be “relatively high.”
In sum, the Court opined:
After balancing the required factors, the Court concludes that Medex waived the attorney client privilege otherwise applicable to the 347 documents in the May 30 production. To summarize, the Court finds that Medex did not take reasonable precautions to protect its privileged information, the number of documents disclosed is significant, no privilege log was provided at the time of disclosure, the contents of some of the documents may be relevant to the heart of the dispute, and Medex made insufficient attempts to mitigate its damage even after it learned of the disclosure.
via Inadvertent Production Results in Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege as to 347 Pages of Emails : Electronic Discovery Law.