Tag Archives: restrictions

Court upholds Handgun-Sales Age Requirement

This case again shows that regulating firearms is constitutional.

In NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 11-10959 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2013), the court upheld 18 USC 922(b)(1) and (c)(1).  These laws prohibit federally licensed firearms dealers from selling handguns under the age of 21.

The NRA claimed that this federal statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.  The court disagreed.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

In a critical passafe, moreover, the Court emphasized that the ‘right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.’ [Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570, at 626].  As the [Supreme] Court explained:

From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose… [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ills, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

Id. at 626-27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Thus, the Circuit Court stated that “Congress designed its scheme to solve a particular problem: violent crimes associated with the trafficking of handguns from federal firearms to licensees to young adults.”  The court, further stated that Congress could have sought to prohibit all persons under 21 from possessing handguns or all guns.  Additionally, the court pointed that under the Census, 18-to-20-year-olds accounted for a disproportionately high percentage of arrests for violent crimes” in 2010.

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Filed under civil rights, courts, District Court, legal decision, Privacy Rights

8th Circuit upholds judicial campaign restrictions

The Eighth Circuit in Wetsal v. Sexton, No. 09-1578, ruled en banc that the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct clauses for endorsement, personal solicitation, and solicitation for a political organization or candidate do not violate the First Amendment.

Under strict scrutiny, the State bore the burden of proof that the endorsement and solicitation clauses advance a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

Minnesota argued that it had a compelling interest in maintaining judicial impartiality and in maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality.  The Eighth Circuit agreed.  “[W]e easily conclude Minnesota’s interest in preserving the appearance of impartiality is compelling, particularly when cast against other interests courts have recognized as compelling.”

The Eighth Circuit also held that the judicial campaign restrictions were narrowly tailored.  The Court explained that the endorsement clause is narrowly tailored since it restricts speech for or against particular parties, rather than for or against particular issues.  The court explains its concern as follows,

Under either framework, a judge “who tips the outcome of a close election in a politician’s favor would necessarily be a powerful political actor, and thus call into question the impartiality of the court.”

The Court held the solicitation clause is also narrowly tailored.  The Court first distinguished itself from Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), which dealt with large group solicitation and signature bans; as opposed to Wersal, which dealt with personal solicitation.  With a personal solicitation, “[a] contribution given directly to a judge, in response to a judge’s personal solicitation of that contribution, carries with it both a greater potential for a quid pro quo and a greater appearance of a quid pro than a contribution given to the judge’s campaign committee at the request of someone other than the judge, or in response to a mass mailing sent above the judge’s signature.”  Quoting Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 989 (7th Cir. 2010).  The Court also concluded that because recusal would not be a workable remedy to prevent bias or the appearance of bias from personal solicitations, the solicitation clause is narrowly tailored.

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Filed under Appellate, courts, Judges, legal decision, Minnesota