Tag Archives: rights

E-Mails and NRLB: Do Employees Have Rights?

On April 30, 2014, the NLRB announced that it is considering overturning Register Guard, 351 NLRB 110 (2007), enfd. in relevant part and remanded sub nom, Guard Publishing v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

The issue resolves around the current existing law that states:

Employees have no statutory right to use the[ir] Employer’s e-mail system for Section 7 purposes.

The NLRB is requesting amici briefs that address the following questions:

  1. Should the Board reconsider the conclusion in Register Guard that employees do not have a statutory right to use their employer’s email system (or other electronic communication systems) for Section 7 purposes?
  2. If the Board overrules Register Guard, what standard(s) of employee access to the employer’s electronic communication systems should be established? What restrictions, if any, may an employer place on such access, and what factors are relevant to such restrictions?
  3. In deciding the above questions, to what extent and how should the impact on the employer of employees’ use of an employer’s electronic communications technology affect the issue?
  4. Do employee personal electronic devices (e.g., phones, tablets), social media accounts, and/or personal email accounts affect the proper balance to the be struck between employers’ rights and employees’ Section 7 rights to communicate about work-related matters? If so, how?
  5. Identify any other technological issues concerning email or other electronic communication systems that the Board should reconsider in answering the foregoing questions, including any relevant changes that may have occurred in electronic communications technology since Register Guard was decided. How should these affect the Board’s decision?

 

The briefs are due on or before June 16, 2014 and cannot exceed 25 pages.

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Filed under attorneys, briefs, civil rights, electronic discovery, employment, federal, labor, legal decision, NLRA, NLRB, rules, Section 7, union

SCOTUS considers whether union neutrality agreements violate Labor Law

The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether “neutrality agreements” between unions and employers violate federal labor law.  Neutrality agreements are contracts between labor unions and employers under which the employers agree to support a union’s attempt to organize its workforce.

In Unite Here Local 355 v. Muhall, the Supreme Court will decide whether these agreements are a “thing of value.”  This definition matters because under Labor Law the exchange of things of value between a labor union and an employer are a felony.  Further, it is a crime for a union to request, demand, receive or accept or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by the statute.

Under the agreements, businesses help labor unions in organization efforts in exchange for labor peace, the New York Times reports. The Washington Post offers some examples: An employer might grant access to employee lists or agree to remain neutral in exchange for union concessions, such as giving up the right to strike.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was a “thing of value” because it includes tangibles and intangibles.  In other words, while the employer and the union can agree on the ground rules, the assistance in this case would constitute payment.

The assistance the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals referred to was as follows.  The casino (employer) agreed to allow union access to worker information and casino grounds, and to allow a unionization vote by cards collected from workers, rather than a secret ballot. The union agreed to refrain from picketing or striking during the union drive.

It is important to note that the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration whether there was monetary value.

What is mind boggling is the fact that neutrality agreements are not only common, but they help avoid conflict and encourages the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.  The preamble of the National Labor Relations Act supports labor peace and the encouragement of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.

The outcome of this contentious and heavily litigated case remains unknown.  The Supreme Court, specifically Justice Roberts, focused on the card-check portion of the neutrality agreement.  Justice Kagan focused on how the benefits bargained by the union benefit employees and unions.

via SCOTUS considers whether union neutrality agreements are improper ‘thing of value’.

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Targeting Union Employees For Layoffs Violates The First Amendment

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals brings an interesting labor decision.  In State Employee Bargaining Coalitation v. Roland, ___F.3d___( 2d Cir. May 31, 2013), the court found that targeting Union employees for layoffs violates the First Amendment (freedom of association).

In this case, the employer employed around 50,000 people.  75% of these employees were members of the Union, and 25% were not.  In December 2002, the employer fired only Union employees.  No non-Union employees were fired.

It is important to note that an employer can manage the size of their work force.  However, the employer cannot target a protected group (here, employees who associated themselves with the Union).  The reason for this is because by targeting a protected group, the effect is to inhibit employees from their freedom to associate.

Under the Constitution, in order for the employer to not violate the Constitution it must show that they used the less restrictive means to accomplish their interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve their goals.

The following are the pivotal facts of this case.  The employer’s interest was to manage their economical situation.  However, the laying off those Union employees had a minimal effect on their budget.  In fact, these Union-only lay offs were not included in the Balanced Budget Plan.  Further, the facts showed that because both Union and non-Union employees had the same health care and pension benefits there was no reason why only the Union employees were targeted.

via Adjunct Law Prof Blog: Targeting Union Employees For Layoffs Violates The First Amendment.

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No citizenship proof for voters

The Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, where the Supreme Court ruled that federal law preempted Arizona’s law.  In other words, it held that Arizona’s requirement of proof of citizenship was in conflict with the National Voter Registration Act.  Thereby, that requirement was rejected.

Arizona’s law required registered voters to show proof of citizenship.  Under Arizona’s law, a person must be a citizen to be eligible to vote.  This case concerned only how Arizona was trying to enforce that qualification.  In 2004, Arizona voters passed Proposition 200, which provided that voters must “present proof of citizenship when they register to vote and to present identification when they vote on election day.”  If an individual does not provide “satisfactory” proof of citizenship, then the application must be rejected.

The issue here is how this citizenship-proof law and the National Voting Registration Act work together.  The Voter Registration Act required that states must “accept and use” the Federal Form.  The Voter Registration Act provided that a state shall “ensure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election… if the valid voter registration form of the applicant is post-marked.” (italics in original).

Although the Voter Registration Act provides that states can create their own state-specific voter-registration forms, the Voting Registration Act also places a backstop.  The Supreme Court explained that,

No matter what procedural hurdles a State’s own form imposes, the Federal Form guarantees that a simple means of registering to vote in federal elections will be available.

Based on this language, the Supreme Court rejected Arizona’s arguments.  If Arizona, or any other state, could demand Federal Form applicants additional pieces of information, “the Federal Form ceases to perform any meaningful function, and would be a feeble means of ‘increas[ing] the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal Office.” (quotations and marks in original).

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ACLU challenges NSA surveillance

On June 11th, the ACLU filed a lawsuit challenging the NSA’s surveillance program.  The ACLU lawsuit alleges that the program violates the First Amendment rights or free speech and association, the right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and that the surveillance program exceeds the authority provided by the Patriot Act.

ACLU, a customer of Verizon, made the following comments:

This dragnet program is surely one of the largest surveillance efforts ever launched by a democratic government against its own citizens.

It is the equivalent of requiring every American to file a daily report with the government of every location they visited, every person they talked to on the phone, the time of each call, and the length of every conversation.  The program goes far beyond even the permissible limits set by the Patriot Act and represents a gross infringement of the freedom of association and the right to privacy.

The complaint can be accessed here.

via ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of NSA Phone Spying Program | American Civil Liberties Union.

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New Homeowners Bill of Rights

Governor Dayton will soon be signing a new bill that includes new protections for homeowners facing foreclosures.  This new law is known as the Homeowners Bill of Rights.

Some of the ways that it protects homeowners are as follows:

  • Loan servicers are required to communicate all options to homeowners.
  • Loan servicers are required to offer loan modifications to all eligible homeowners.
  • “Dual tracking” is banned.  Dual tracking is when servicers foreclose without a clear yes or no on loan modification.
  • Servicers are required to assist homeowners in submitting documentation regarding the foreclosure process.
  • Homeowners are allowed to take the servicer to court to stop a foreclosure if the servicer fails to comply with any aspect of the law.

 

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D.C. Circuit Strikes Down NLRB Notice Rule

In NAM v. NLRB, No. 12-5068 (D.C Cir. May 17, 2013), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck against the NRLB notice rule.

The background is as follows.  On August 30, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) published a final rule regarding notice posting.  76 Fed. Reg. 54,006.  That final rule provides:

All employees subject to the NLRA must post notices to employees, in conspicuous places, informing them of their NLRA rights, together with Board contact information and information concerning basic enforcement procedures…”

39 C.F.R. 104.202(a).  The final rule also declares that failure to post this notice is an unfair labor practice (ULP).   In other words, if an employer fails to put up a NLRB notice, the employer violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  This is essentially the focus for the Court of Appeals.

The court explained that under Section 8(e), the Board cannot find non-coercive employer speech to be an ULP or evidence of an ULP.  The Court of Appeals found that the NLRB’s final rule did both.  The court states,

Under the rule an employer’s failure to post the required notice constitutes an unfair labor practice.  See 29 C.F.R. 104.210, 104.201.  And the Board may consider an employer’s ‘knowing and willful’ noncompliance to be ‘evidence of antiunion animus in cases in which unlawful motive [i]s an element of an unfair labor practice.’ 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,035-36; see also 29 C.F.R. 104.214(b).

(as in original).

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Court orders legal representation for immigrants in deportation proceedings

I first came across this decision when I was listening to NPR.  In this case, which is a first of its kind, a federal judge ordered that states have to provide legal representation for immigrants with mental disabilities – when these immigrants are being detained and facing deportation.

This case is really surprising because immigrants generally do not have a right to an attorney.  The Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 371 US 335 (1963), decided that the right to counsel is a fundamental right in criminal cases.  In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032 (1984), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a deportation case is not a criminal case, but an administrative one.

Since deportation proceedings are not a criminal crime, there is no right to a lawyer.  The detainees not guaranteed counsel had presumably covered children, the mentally disabled, victims of sex trafficking, refugees, torture survivors and legal permanent residents.

Federal Judge Dolly M. Fee ordered immigration courts in three states to provide legal representation for immigrants with mental disabilities who are in detention and facing deportation, if they cannot represent themselves.  The immigrant in this case had severe mental retardation that prevented him from arguing for himself in court or even understanding his situation.

The NY Times reports that subsequently, “federal immigration officials issued a new policy that would expand the California ruling nationwide, making government-paid legal representation available to people with mental disabilities in courts in every state.”

Edited: To add other Supreme Court cases.

via Legal Aid Ordered for Mentally Disabled Immigrants – NYTimes.com.

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Non-Citizens and Deportation for Convicted Crimes

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 11-702 (2013) is an interesting Supreme Court decision.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 USC 1101, provides that a non-citizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony may be deported from the US.  As way of background, ordinarily, a non-citizen when facing deportation, may ask for discretionary forms of relief and cancellation of the removal.  The exception is for aggravated felonies.

This case comes because among the crimes that are classified as aggravated felonies are illicit drug trafficking offenses.  The issue the Supreme Court addressed is whether this category includes state criminal statutes that extends to the social sharing of a small amount of marijuana.

In a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s position. The court explained that if a state crime of marijuana distribution does not closely match the federal crime of distribution, in a direct comparison of what each covers, it is not an “aggravated felony.”

In this case, the non-citizen came to the US legally in 1984.  In a traffic stop, the police found 1.3 grams of marijuana.  The non-citizen pled guilty to the charge of possession with the intent to distribute.  Under Georgia statute, this violation may be punishable up to 5 years.  Given this, the government alleged this was an aggravated felony.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument because it held the generically defined federal crime is “any federal punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” 18 USC 924(c)(2).  “[N]ot just any offense ‘under the CSA’.”

The Supreme Court further explained,

This is the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felony.’  Once again we hold that the Government’s approach defies ‘the commonsense conception’ of these terms….

Sharing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, let alone possession with intent to do so, ‘does not fit easily into the ‘every day understanding’ of ‘trafficking,” which ordinarily… means some sort of commercial dealing.’…

Nor is it sensible that a state statute that criminalizes conducted that the CSA treats as a misdemeanor should be designated an ‘aggravated felony.’  We hold that it may not be.

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Drop in Employment Civil Rights Lawsuits

TRAC Reports has recently released its latest data on the trends of employment civil rights lawsuits.  The decrease of civil rights lawsuits in the employment context is not surprising.

TRAC Reports states:

The latest available data from the federal courts show that during February 2013 the government reported 950 new employment civil rights filings. According to the case-by-case information analyzed by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse TRAC, this number is down 7.9 percent over the previous month when the number of filings of this type totaled 1,032, and has dropped 13.2 percent from its level one year ago see Table 1.

Drop in Employment Civil Rights Lawsuits

 

TRAC further states that the volume of civil rights matters filed in federal districts during February 2013 was 3.1 per every million persons in the US.  Last year, that number of filings was 4.2.

via Drop in Employment Civil Rights Lawsuits.

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